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Abstract
Theory: We argue that support among California voters for Proposition 187 in 1994
was an example of cyclical nativism. This nativism was provoked primarily by California's
economic downturn during the early 1990s.
Hypotheses: We develop four specic hypotheses to explain how poor economic condi-
tions in California and the consequent nativistic sentiments would result in support for
Proposition 187:
1. voters who believe that California's economic condition is poor will be more likely
to support Proposition 187;
2. voters who perceive themselves as being economically threatened by illegal immi-
grants will be more likely to support Proposition 187;
3. voters with lower levels of education are more economically vulnerable and will be
more likely to support Proposition 187;
4. voters in Southern California feel more directly aected by illegal immigration and
will be more likely to support Proposition 187.
Methods: To test these hypotheses, we analyze voter exit poll data from the 1994 Cali-
fornia election. We utilize a two-stage probit model to allow for the endogeneity which
results from the politicization of illegal immigration during this election.
Results: We nd support for our hypotheses in the data. These ndings cause us to
conclude that nativism, fueled by economic conditions, was a salient factor leading many
Californians to support Proposition 187.
The Resurgence of Nativism in California?
The Case of Proposition 187 and Illegal Immigration

R. Michael Alvarez Tara L. Buttereld
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a resurgence of nativism, the practice or policy of favoring
native-born citizens over immigrants, across the United States. This nativist sentiment
is expressed as a growing distrust of the immigrants already in the country and a strong
desire to tighten laws that would keep others out. When surveyed on the topic of immi-
gration, U.S. citizens often voice their belief that the presence of illegal immigrant workers
depresses wages and displaces native workers (Muller et al., 1985; Cornelius, 1982; Los
Angeles Times, 1988).
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Media throughout the country have questioned whether or not
the United States is still capable of controlling its own borders (El Paso Times, 1994;
San Francisco Examiner, 1989; U.S. News & World Report, 1985).
Nowhere has this sentiment been more evident than in California. During the early
1990s, the Golden State suered numerous economic setbacks associated with military
base closures and defense industry cutbacks. Nearly one million jobs were lost, state tax
revenues diminished, and the state experienced repeated budget decits. By 1994, Cali-
fornia was in the midst of that state's worst recession since the Great Depression. In that
year, California legislators introduced 30 bills concerning legal and illegal immigration,
and the state's residents produced two related ballot initiatives. One of these initia-
tives was Proposition 187. Called by its supporters the Save Our State initiative, this
controversial proposition was approved by 59 percent of California voters in November
1994. The proposition's popularity with voters coupled with California's dreary economy
gives rise to the question: were the state's economic condition and the strong appeal of
Proposition 187 to voters related?
Ostensibly, the purpose of Proposition 187 was to deny certain publicly funded social
and health care services to illegal aliens and to prevent their enrollment in tax-supported

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educational institutions.
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Proponents of this initiative argued that California had
become a welfare magnet for illegal aliens, who used counterfeit documents to access the
U.S. job market and social service agencies at an estimated cost to California taxpayers
of more than $5 billion a year. According to their argument, stemming the tide of illegal
immigration was needed to halt the spread of disease, eliminate overcrowding in schools,
and prevent wage rates from dropping still further as unemployed illegals competed for
scarce jobs in a shrinking economy. In essence, the authors of Proposition 187 sought to
end illegal immigration by making it unattractive and by eliminating many of the reasons
for which immigrants might come to the United States.
We argue that voter support for Proposition 187 is an example of cyclical nativism and
that the impetus for this nativism was the sagging California economy. Previously, the
relationship between economic cycles and nativist sentiment has been examined only by
comparing an aggregate economic insecurity measure or immigration policy with national
unemployment and GNP trends. We use exit poll data from the 1994 California vote
on Proposition 187 to examine the impact of economic perceptions on support for the
initiative. By controlling for a number of factors, we show that economic perceptions
had a signicant (perhaps overriding) inuence on the passage of Proposition 187.
To understand the reasoning behind our argument, we begin by discussing the liter-
ature on initiative and proposition voting. Next, we examine the economic motivation
for U.S. immigration policy, consider California's history of immigration restrictions, and
place Proposition 187 in the larger context of the cyclical nativism that has character-
ized relations between the United States and Mexico. Then, we develop hypotheses about
how nativist attitudes might be reected in the voting behavior of specic groups, and we
test these hypotheses using Voter News Service (VNS) exit poll data from the November
1994 California election. To specify an appropriate statistical model of the voting on
Proposition 187 so that we can test our nativist hypotheses, we consider the political
context in which the proposition passed. We nd that, because the gubernatorial and
senatorial candidates had highly politicized the issue of illegal immigration, support for
Proposition 187 is endogenous to support for these candidates. We formulate a statistical
model (a two-stage probit) which allows for this endogeneity. We conclude that, despite
the politicization of this initiative in the 1994 election, the California economy had an
extremely strong, if not determining, eect on the passage of Proposition 187. Finally,
we discuss the larger implications of our ndings for contemporary American politics.
2 Voting for Initiatives and Propositions: Economics
and Information
The nativist voting argument described in this paper is predicated on the principle that
nativism uctuates with changing economic conditions in the immigrant-receiving coun-
try and is strongest during economic contractions. Although scholars have previously
studied the eects of economic conditions on national elections (for example, Lewis-Beck,
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1990), specically, U.S. presidential elections (Fiorina, 1981; Kiewiet, 1983; Markus,
1988), and have agreed that economic conditions are important in determining candidate
choice, there is a paucity of research linking economic conditions with voting on ballot
propositions. An exception is a recent study by Bowler and Donovan (1994a) which
nds that a relationship exists between economic conditions and voting on state ballot
propositions in California. Specically, voters are less likely to adopt ballot propositions
when economic conditions are poor because of risk aversity. The researchers do make an
exception for propositions that may pass when the economy is bad because of notoriety
and subject matter. Unfortunately, Proposition 187 must be considered an exception;
therefore, this study provides little insight into the behavior of California voters during
the 1994 election.
However, historical examples support our nativist voting argument. One measure of
nativism is immigration policy. The United States has enacted and enforced immigration
restrictions to coincide with economic downturns and justied these restrictions with the
nativist arguments of depressed wages, displaced workers, and scarce resources (Hutchin-
son, 1981, pp. 492-504). California has also viewed immigration in economic terms and
has relied on nativist policies when resources were perceived to be scarce or competition
for these resources intensied. For example, in 1920, California voters enacted an initia-
tive that prohibited aliens from owning land if they were racially ineligible for citizenship
under federal law. Because of the zone-and-quota system on which U.S. immigration was
based at that time, this measure eectively prohibited the Japanese living in the state
from owning land. Thus, in general, U.S. immigration policy and California's response
to immigrants provide evidence to support this principle of economically driven cyclical
nativism.
Because eorts to gain support for Proposition 187 and California's 1994 gubernato-
rial and senatorial campaigns emphasized Mexico as a source of illegal immigrants, we
consider the specic relationship between restrictions on Mexican immigration and U.S.
economic conditions. The long-term relationship between the United States and Mexico
provides both historical and empirical evidence to support the principle that nativism
uctuates with changing economic conditions. Since the 1930s, there have been three
cycles of increased nativism toward legal and illegal Mexican immigrants which have
coincided with economic downturns brought about by wars and stagation and have re-
sulted in stricter immigration laws: (1) deportation of native-born Mexican Americans
and Mexican immigrants between 1929 and 1933, (2) Operation Wetback of the 1950s,
and (3) 1980 to present. In addition, research has shown that uctuations in the United
States unemployment rate and in the level of general economic insecurity within the
U.S. population are highly correlated with the rise and fall of anti-immigrant sentiment,
particularly as directed against Mexican immigrants during the twentieth century (Cor-
nelius, 1982). These general immigration trends and specic political responses support
our nativist voting theory.
Although the literature on initiative and proposition voting does not provide support
for the relationship between economic conditions and the passage of Proposition 187 so
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that we must rely instead on historical example, it does suggest what factors determine an
individual's vote choices and what information he uses when making those choices (Lupia,
1994). Voting behavior on propositions is not necessarily or consistently a function of
party identication, education, race, income, or region of residence; however, political
ideology may be correlated with vote choice because voters use it as an information
shortcut (Magleby, 1984).
Further, the information available to the voter is dierent in two distinct ways from
that which is available in a standard candidate election. A brief summary of the initia-
tive appears on the ballot, and additional detailed information is provided by the state in
the ballot pamphlet. In California, this pamphlet summarizes the initiative and presents
arguments for and against it. However, the usefulness of this pamphlet is doubtful given
its small font, confusing and complicated prose, and extensive length. Standard election
information shortcuts, such as a party identication or past experience, on which can-
didate voting decisions are usually based, are absent (Downs, 1957; Key, 1966; Fiorina,
1981). Because the election literature routinely furnished by the registrar of voters pro-
vides too many details and the initiative campaign oers too few shortcuts, voters may
rely more on media and elite endorsements to reduce the information costs of voting on
propositions (Magleby, 1984; Cronin, 1989).
In this particular election, the voters had an important alternative source of information|
candidate endorsements. Candidates in both the senatorial and gubernatorial races
discussed Proposition 187, staked out opposing positions in their speeches and adver-
tisements, and oered immigration policies. Both California Governor Pete Wilson and
Democratic challenger Kathleen Brown developed immigration action plans that empha-
sized the California-Mexico border and used immigration themes extensively in their
campaign ads.
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Because of the endogeneity implied by this relationship (specically,
that an individual's vote on Proposition 187 could be inuenced or aected by either or
both the gubernatorial race or the senatorial race), this important source of information
is controlled for in our analysis.
Now we can develop a series of hypotheses about voters which can test to see if
voter support for Proposition 187 is, indeed, an example of economically driven cyclical
nativism. Our argument requires that we consider not only the actions of the voter in
making the link between California's poor economic conditions and immigration but also
the socioeconomic characteristics of the voter which are predicted by economic conditions
and nativist history. We expect (contrary to the literature on initiative voting) that race,
education, area of residence, and economic conditions are important determinants in an
individual's vote decision on Proposition 187.
State Economic Conditions and Personal Finances. We expect that voters who
perceive the state's economic conditions as poor would be more likely to support the
proposition. Because of simplistic nativist attitudes, these voters blame the existence of
poor economic conditions on the presence of illegal immigrants. The condition of the
California economy should be the dominant factor over an individual's personal nance
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because nativist cycles are driven by poor overall economic conditions of the state or
nation, not by an individual's situation.
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Race. History shows us that nativism is not race dependent in terms of those who attack
or those who are attacked. Both in California and throughout the United States, the race
or ethnicity of the group toward which nativist actions are directed has not been constant,
nor has the attack always been led by any one particular racial or ethnic group. The
dierentiating factor has been simply immigrant versus native status. However, those
voters who perceive themselves as threatened nancially by illegal immigrants and those
voters who are racially or ethnically similar to the immigrants being attacked should be
the exception. Specically, blacks have historically perceived themselves as competing
with illegal immigrants for jobs (Muller et al., 1985; Cornelius, 1982); therefore, blacks
would be expected to support the measure more than other racial groups. In addition,
because the debate over Proposition 187 was focused on Mexico, one would expect the
Hispanic population to vote against this initiative for two reasons: (1) California has
a large recent Mexican immigrant population which may sympathize with the illegal
immigrant population and (2) the Hispanic population in general may view this initiative
as racist and aimed at Hispanics and, more specically, at Mexicans.
Education. We would expect an inverse relationship between education and nativist
attitudes. Lesser-educated individuals may be more susceptible to nativist arguments or
sentiments because they perceive themselves to compete directly with immigrant workers
in the labor market.
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Area of Residence. We would expect nativist voting behavior to vary with geograph-
ical distance from the immigrant source. This theory is the immigration equivalent of
the NIMBY (not in my backyard) concept. Simply, nativism is more intense, or more
prevalent, closer to the California-Mexico border. Although border communities often
benet nancially from illegal immigration, residents of these communities frequently re-
port that they view immigrants as contributing to criminal activity and detracting from
economic prosperity.
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Therefore, we would assume that voters who reside in Southern
California would vote in favor of the amendment with greater frequency than residents
of Northern California.
3 A First Look at the Data
To test these hypotheses, we analyze Voter News Service (VNS) exit poll data from
the 1994 California election by Proposition 187 vote choice and by demographic and
attitudinal measures (see Tables 1 and 2).
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Tables 1 and 2 go here
In Table 1, when race is considered, whites supported Proposition 187 with the highest
percentage of yes votes (59 percent). The black and Asian votes were split 46 percent for
the measure and 54 percent against it, while Hispanics voted predominantly against, 25
5
percent for and 75 percent against. At this level of analysis, the race of the voter does
not appear to be a reliable predictor of an individual's vote for or against the proposition
except among Hispanics.
Next, we consider two measures of economic potential, educational attainment and
employment status. We nd that support for Proposition 187 was highest among high
school graduates (63 percent in favor) and decreases as education level increases. When
employment status is considered, more unemployed individuals supported the proposition
than did employed voters, 59 percent compared with 41 percent. As we hypothesized,
voters with lower economic potential are more inclined to support Proposition 187.
Finally in Table 1, we consider the eects of a voter's area of residence. Central Valley
residents were almost evenly split between support for and opposition to the measure.
Bay Area (Northern California) residents were predominately against the measure (60
percent against), and Southern California residents were strongly in favor with 61 percent
supporting the measure. These preliminary ndings with respect to race, educational
attainment, and area of residence support our nativist argument that members of the
targeted racial group will be less likely to support the measure, and that economically
disadvantaged voters and those living in closest proximity to the immigrant source are
more likely to support it.
Turning to Table 2, we nd strong support for our hypothesis that economic per-
ceptions inuenced support for Proposition 187. Sixty-two percent of those voters who
viewed their personal situation as worse voted for the measure. When asked about state
economic conditions, again those who thought the state was in poor condition voted
predominately (69 percent) in favor of the measure. Obviously, strong negative opinions
concerning the state's economy or personal nances strengthened a voter's support for
Proposition 187.
When considering the measures of partisanship, ideology, and candidate support (see
Table 2), we see that 73 percent of Republicans supported the measure while only 36
percent of Democrats did. Seventy-one percent of voters who described themselves as
conservatives favored Proposition 187. Moderates split almost evenly on the measure
with 51 percent voting for and 49 percent voting against, and Liberals strongly voted
against (69 percent). Given that propositions are not directly endorsed by a party, this
is a peculiar result. However, this result may indicate that voting was inuenced by
the gubernatorial and senatorial races. When the gubernatorial and senatorial races are
considered, individuals who voted for incumbent Republican Governor Pete Wilson (who
campaigned openly for Proposition 187) overwhelmingly supported the measure with 77
percent voting in favor. While only 29 percent of those who supported Kathleen Brown,
the Democratic candidate for governor, voted in favor of the measure. A similar result
is found when the senate race is considered. Seventy-nine percent of Republican Senate
candidate Michael Hungton's supporters favored Proposition 187 while only 35 percent
of Democratic incumbent Dianne Feinstein's supporters voted in favor of the measure.
These preliminary ndings support the idea that voters were using information from
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these other campaigns in their vote decision and were making the nativist link between
poor economic conditions and immigration.
4 A Multivariate Model of Support for Proposition
187
The data presented in Tables 1 and 2 provide preliminary support for our nativist voting
argument. However, it is dicult to discern from these bivariate statistics the relative
importance of these voter characteristics and attitudes in determining a voter's support
for Proposition 187. To make this comparision, we employ a multivariate statistical
model.
Two important aspects of our multivariate model are that it has a binary dependent
variable and that it allows for endogeneity. In this instance, voter response to Proposi-
tion 187 is represented by a binary dependent variable where support is coded high and
opposition is coded low. We assume that the survey observations of whether or not an
individual supported Proposition 187 are the realizations of this binary choice variable
(Y

). Specically, when the voter's underlying predisposition (Y ) to support this propo-
sition is greater than some threshold (k), the voter will support the measure. Otherwise,
she will oppose it. Hence,
Y

= 1 i Y  k (1)
Y

= 0 i Y < k
The form of our dependent variable necessitates use of a binary choice model. Thus, we
use a binary probit model which takes the form:
Prob(Support Proposition 187) = Pr(Y = 1) (2)
Pr(Y = 1) = F (X
i

j
)
where X
i
is our matrix of independent variables, 
j
are the coecients we estimate, and
F is the cumulative normal density.
As asserted earlier, there is reason to believe that support for Proposition 187 is
endogenous with respect to candidate support in both the gubernatorial and senatorial
races. In other words, it is likely that voter opinions regarding Proposition 187 strongly
inuenced candidate choices and that candidate choice inuenced voter support for or
opposition to the initiative. As is true of the linear regression model, endogeneity in
binary choice models results in biased coecients and, therefore, incorrect inferences
(Alvarez, 1997; Amemiya, 1978; Maddala, 1983; Rivers and Vuong, 1988).
Our expectations about endogeneity lead us to posit the following structural model
for these underlying predispositions:
Y
P187
= X
i1

1
+ 
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7
YGR
= X
i2

2
+ 
2P
Y
P187
+ "
2
Y
SR
= X
i3

3
+ 
3P
Y
P187
+ "
3
where Y
P187
is the underlying propensity to support Proposition 187, Y
GR
is the underly-
ing propensity to support the Republican candidate for governor (Pete Wilson), and Y
SR
is the underlying propensity to support the Republican candidate for senator (Michael
Hungton). Each of these underlying predispositions translates into the observed set of
binary variables as given by the general rule in Equation 1.
Thus, we assume that the predisposition to support Proposition 187 is a function of
a set of independent variables (X
i1
) and the predisposition to support the Republican
candidates in the gubernatorial and senatorial races. The candidate support predis-
positions in each race are themselves functions of other independent variables and the
predisposition to support Proposition 187.
If we had survey measures of these three predispositions (support for Proposition 187,
the Republican gubernatorial candidate, and the Republican senatorial candidate), our
estimation procedure would be simple because we could utilize two-stage least squares to
estimate the model parameters. Specically, we would write reduced-form equations for
each of the three predisposition measures using all of the exogenous variables in the equa-
tions above to estimate instrumental variables for the endogenous variables. Then, these
instruments could be substituted for the right-hand-side endogenous variables. Finally,
the parameters of the model in Equation 3 could be estimated.
Although we measure only the binary realizations of these dependent variables, the
estimation procedure we use is almost identical to a two-stage least squares approach.
We begin by writing the reduced-form equations using all of the exogenous variables in
the model (we denote the set of all exogenous variables X
R)
:
Pr(Y
P187
= 1) = F (X
R

1
) (4)
Pr(Y
GR
= 1) = F (X
R

2
)
Pr(Y
SR
= 1) = F (X
R

3
)
These equations are estimated using probit, under the assumption that F is the standard
cumulative normal density. From the estimates of the three 
j
, we produce predicted val-
ues for the three underlying predispositions (
b
Y
P187
,
b
Y
GR
, and
b
Y
SR
). Next, these predicted
values are substituted for the right-hand-side endogenous variables of Equation 3, and
then we estimate the model also using probit. This two-stage procedure yields consistent
estimates of the model parameters in Equation 3 (Amemyia, 1978; Maddala, 1983; Rivers
and Vuong, 1988) and has been used in political science research (Alvarez, 1997; Fiorina,
1981; Franklin and Jackson, 1983).
Given this estimation procedure for the model, we now consider the model specica-
tion. We discuss how we specify the independent variables for the Proposition 187 model
below. In the appendix, we discuss the reduced-form estimates (see Table 5) and how we
specify the gubernatorial and senatorial voting models (see Tables 6 and 7).
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In our specication of voting for Proposition 187, we include several socioeconomic
variables, economic and nancial perceptions, political ideology, and political party af-
liation. Race is included to enable us to test the way in which dierent racial groups
responded to Proposition 187. Race consists of the four binary variables: black, Hispanic
or Latino, Asian, and other minority. The white category was excluded. In addition, a
gender variable was included. It is a binary variable with 1 denoting a female voter.
Respondent education level and employment status were included to provide some
measure of economic deprivation and competition and to test the hypothesis that sup-
port for the measure will be inversely related to educational attainment. Educational
attainment was coded as four binary variables, with less than a high school education
being the excluded category. Respondent education level and employment status, as
a binary variable, were included to provide some measure of economic deprivation and
competition and to test the hypothesis that support for the measure will be inversely
related to educational attainment. To allow for possible regional eects on voter choice,
binary variables were included for three of four major regions that the survey included
Los Angeles City, Los Angeles Suburbs, Other Southern California, and Central Valley.
Northern California was the region excluded.
Next, the voter's assessments of the change in her personal nances from two years
ago and the condition of the state's economy were included to measure the inuence of
economic evaluations on her vote. These variables were coded with 1-to-3 and 1-to-4
scales with 1 denoting worse or poor, respectively.
Political party aliation and political ideology were included to measure these inu-
ences on the vote. Both of these variables were included as two binary variables, Democrat
and Independent for political party aliation and Independent and Liberal for political
ideology with Republican and Conservative being the excluded categories, respectively.
Also, the instruments calculated for an individual's gubernatorial and senatorial votes
were included.
Given this estimation technique and model specication, our argument about nativist
voting can be tested, and we can determine whether or not the race, education, opinion
of California's economic condition, and area of residence coecients are, as hypothesized,
reliable predictors of an individual's vote on Proposition 187. In the next section, we
present the estimated results of this model specication.
5 Determinants of Support for Proposition 187
5.1 Two-stage probit results
The two-stage probit results are presented in Table 3. To demonstrate the importance
of controlling for the endogeneity imposed by the information sources in this election,
we present and compare probit and two-stage probit results. The following discussion of
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the coecient estimates is brief, given the diculty inherent in attempting to interpret
these coecients, particularly the inability to compare the relative inuence of the coef-
cients on a voter's choice. For these reasons, our discussion emphasizes the statistically
signicant coecients and the preliminary implications of these results for our proposed
nativist voting argument. Next, we present a more thorough discussion in which an av-
erage voter is selected allowing probabilities to be computed, and then we compare the
relative magnitude of voter characteristics and attitudes on Proposition 187 voting.
Table 3 goes here
First, when we compare both sets of coecients from the probit and two-stage pro-
bit models, the most signicant and important dierence is with respect to the party
identication and political ideology coecients. In the two-stage model, which allows
for the inclusion of an individual's vote in senatorial and gubernatorial races, the party
identication coecients are not signicant, as the literature on initiative voting predicts;
however, when these votes are not included, these coecients are signicant, which can
yield a misleading result. Specically, it was not party identication that was signicant
in determining an individual's vote choice but rather an individual's gubernatorial vote
that was signicant in determining his support of Proposition 187. Voters are using these
elite endorsements (in this instance, candidate policy positions) as shortcuts or cues in
their vote choice, which is consistent with previous research (Lupia, 1994).
The other interesting dierence between the probit model and two-stage probit model
results is the signicance of the race coecients. In both models, the Hispanic or Latino
coecient is signicant and negative as expected because they are the targeted racial
group. However, in the two-stage probit analysis, the black coecient is also signicant.
This nding is supported by the fact that blacks have traditionally perceived themselves
as being nancially threatened by recent immigrants. These dierences between the
models suggest that controlling for the imposed endogeneity of candidate endorsements
is important, and by doing so, results are produced which are consistent with both the
existing initiative voting literature and our nativist voting argument.
Now, we consider the other signicant coecients in the two-stage probit model. The
voter's perception of the state's economy is statistically signicant and that of personal
nances is not. These results are as expected and support the nativist voting argument
that voters are associating a poor economy with illegal immigration. The statistical
signicance of the education variable is also as predicted. Education has a negative
eect on the probability that a voter will support the measure, and this eect increases
with educational attainment. Finally, all of the Southern California region variables (Los
Angeles City, Los Angeles Suburbs, and Other Southern California) are signicant and
positive. This result conrms the hypothesis that support of the measure is linked to a
voter's proximity to the California-Mexico border.
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5.2 Relative magnitudes of the estimated eects
To better understand the degrees to which these dierent variables inuence a voter's
probability of supporting Proposition 187, we rst dene an average or hypothetical voter.
This hypothetical voter is a white, female, Southern California resident with an average
education (some college but no degree). She thinks her family's nancial situation is the
same as it was two years ago and that the state's economy is not so good. In addition,
she considers herself a Democrat and, in most political matters, a moderate.
Formulating an average voter when a model contains so many variables that cannot
be easily averaged, such as party aliation, is a dicult task because there is no correct
method or rule to apply. The following logic was used in formulating this hypothetical
voter. This particular voter seemed to best represent the exit poll sample. For example,
more whites voted than any other racial group. More women voted than men. There
were more voters from Southern California than from the Bay Area (Northern California).
Women were on average aliated with the Democratic Party, and the average voter was
given the most prevalent political ideology of moderate. In addition, she was given the
most common economic perceptions of all the voters surveyed.
Now, using these xed voter opinions and characteristics, we can calculate probabili-
ties that show the eect of changing one independent variable at a time on the probability
of supporting the measure (see Table 4). This technique allows us to test our hypothe-
ses that race, economic perceptions, and area of residence are important in determining
Proposition 187 voting and that political party aliation and political ideology are not.
Table 4 goes here
If we change the hypothetical voter's race, the results are convincing evidence for
the hypothesis that those voters who perceived themselves as threatened nancially by
illegal immigrants should strongly support the measure and those voters who are racially
similar to the immigrants being attacked should oppose the measure. For example, if the
average voter's race is changed from white to Hispanic, ceteris paribus, she will oppose
the measure. Her probability of supporting the measure decreases from 57 percent to 34
percent. But, if she is black her probability of supporting the measure increases from
57 percent to 68 percent. However, if her race is changed from white to Asian, there is
practically no change in the probabilities, 57 percent compared with 58 percent.
Next, we consider the eect of the voter's economic perceptions on Proposition 187
voting. The results show that, of the voter characteristics which could be changed or
inuenced during the course of a political campaign, an individual's economic percep-
tions have the single largest eect on vote decision. When all voter characteristics are
considered, only being Hispanic changes an individual's probability of supporting the
measure more. An individual's perceptions of the state's economy can change her from
an opponent to a supporter of the measure. Specically, if she thought that the state's
economy was poor instead of good, she was 20 percent more likely to support the mea-
sure. The rst dierence calculations also conrm the previous results that the voter's
perception of the state's economic conditions has a greater eect on her vote than her
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views of her family's nances. There was no change in her level of support if she per-
ceived her own nancial situation was worse instead of better. These results show that
economic perceptions had a signicant inuence on the passage of Proposition 187 and,
therefore, strongly support our nativist voting argument.
Then, we consider the eects of political ideology and political party aliation on
the average voter's probability of supporting Proposition 187. Changing her political
ideology from liberal to conservative causes a 9 percent increase in support, 54 percent
compared with 63 percent. However, this result implies that support for the measure
is independent of ideology, meaning that being liberal, ceteris paribus, cannot make an
average individual an opponent of the measure. When the average voter's party aliation
is changed from Democrat to Republican, her probability of supporting the proposition
changes from 57 percent to 56 percent. Party aliation was not important in determining
vote choice. This result is consistent with the initiative voting literature.
Finally, we consider regional dierences by changing the hypothetical voter's area of
residence from Southern California to the Bay Area. This change is signicant. Now, no
matter what, the hypothetical voter will vote no on the measure, 46 percent compared
with 57 percent. This nding provides additional evidence of the hypothesized regional
variation in support for the measure.
These results indicate that an average voter's opinion of the California economy,
race, and area of residence were very important, as hypothesized by our nativist voting
argument, in determining her vote. Specically, by changing only one of these character-
istics, the average voter can be changed from a supporter to an opponent of Proposition
187. These results strongly support our argument that voters were making the nativist
association between the economy and immigration.
5.3 How important was California's economic condition?
To verify that individuals are making the nativist link between poor economic conditions
and immigration, we want to test further the importance of a voter's economic evaluation
in determining the election outcome. To do so, we use the data and the probit coecient
estimates to calculate the expected election outcomes as we change voter perceptions
of the state's economy. The model predicts 57 percent would vote for and 43 percent
against the measure given the actual voter preferences. However, if all respondents had
viewed the California economy as poor, keeping all other voter characteristics unchanged,
then 68 percent of them would have supported the measure. Similarly, if all respondents
had viewed the economy as excellent, ceteris paribus, then the measure would have been
defeated with 64 percent voting against the measure (Figures 1 and 2). Specically,
individuals who thought the economy was bad were more likely to support the measure,
and as the percentage of individuals who viewed the economy as bad increased, the
measure had a greater probability of passing. These results strongly suggest that voters
were making the nativist link between poor economic conditions and immigration.
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Figure 1 goes here
Now, to test further the role of economic perceptions in the electoral success of Propo-
sition 187 and to verify that the above results are not simply an artifact of these hypo-
thetical extreme voter perceptions, we assume a distribution of economic perceptions and
randomly assign economic perceptions to the voters, holding all other voter character-
istics constant. First, we assume that the distribution of economic perceptions during
better economic conditions would mirror the distribution of economic perceptions given
by the respondents. For example, of those voters who voted on Proposition 187, the
distribution of economic perceptions was as follows: 20 percent poor, 60 percent not so
good, 19 percent good, and 1 percent excellent. Hypothesizing better economic condi-
tions, we changed the distribution of economic perceptions to be 20 percent excellent, 60
percent good, 19 percent not so good, and 1 percent poor. Then, these perceptions were
randomly reassigned to the voters, holding all other characteristics constant. When the
election results are recalculated, given these new economic perceptions, the measure does
not pass, with 54 percent voting against the measure. This result clearly demonstrates
that voter perceptions of California's economy, independent of all other voter characteris-
tics, were important in the passage of Proposition 187 and could determine the outcome
of the election. These ndings support our nativist voting argument. Clearly, California
voters were making the nativist link between poor economic conditions and immigration.
6 Conclusions and Discussion
Our analysis shows that the voter's view of California's economy is important in deter-
mining support for or opposition to Proposition 187 and that voters were making the
nativist link between poor economic conditions and immigration. Among voter charac-
terisitics which could change during the course of an election, a voter's economic percep-
tions have the single largest eect on vote choice, and these perceptions can transform
an opponent into a supporter. Our analysis also conrms that it is a voter's perception
of the state's economy, not her own personal nancial situation, that mattered, as we
predicted, because nativist cycles are driven by poor overall economic conditions of the
state or nation, not by an individual's situation. Further, when model election results
are considered, we nd that changing economic perceptions by a random process while
holding all other voter characteristics constant can change the election outcome. Simply,
economic perceptions mattered. Individuals were making the nativist link and blaming
poor economic conditions on the presence of illegal immigrants.
In addition to economic perceptions, we hypothesized that race, area of residence,
and education would be important factors in a voter's support of Proposition 187. With
respect to race, we found, as hypothesized, that those voters who perceive themselves as
threatened nancially by illegal immigrants support the measure more and those voters
who are racially similar to the immigrants being attacked oppose the measure more than
other racial groups. Specically, Hispanics voted strongly against the proposition, and
blacks were more likely to support the proposition. With respect to area of residence,
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all levels of analysis show that Southern California residents support the measure more
than Northern California residents as predicted by our nativist voting theory, which
hypothesized that support for the measure would vary with proximity to the immigrant
source. We found that by changing an average voter's area of residence from Southern
California to the Bay Area (Northern California), ceteris paribus, we could change a
supporter of the initiative into an opponent. Finally, we also found that there was
a negative relationship between education and support for the initiative so all of our
hypotheses were shown to be supported by the data. Clearly, economic perceptions,
race, area of residence, and education were all important factors in determining voter
support for Proposition 187.
This thorough analysis of the data supports the proposed nativist voting argument
that poor economic conditions in California caused a nativist response to the Mexican
illegal immigrant population, which resulted in the passage of Proposition 187. There-
fore, voters who supported California's Proposition 187 were concerned about the state's
declining economy and viewed illegal immigrants as exacerbating if not causing this de-
cline. These results also validate previous survey ndings of the NIMBY immigration
theory, which suggests that proximity to the immigrant source can increase the degree
or intensity of the nativism in the community. In addition, we oer a new method of
measuring nativist-sentiment voting which can be employed in future research. Previ-
ously, the relationship between economic cycles and nativist sentiment has been examined
only by comparing an aggregate economic insecurity measure or immigration policy with
national unemployment and GNP trends.
Our nativist voting argument also appears to oer an explanation of the issues debated
during the 1994 California gubernatorial election and of the outcome. Although typically
an incumbent cannot be reelected during bad economic times, Governor Pete Wilson was
able to overcome this problem by focusing his campaign on illegal immigrants and blaming
them for the state's precarious nancial situation. This skillful maneuvering aorded him
another term in oce. The election became a referendum not on the incumbent but on
immigration.
Arizona, Florida, and Virginia have approved similar immigration measures. To fur-
ther validate our results and provide additional support for our nativist voting argument,
it would be interesting to compare the economic conditions in these states at the time
of the passage of these measures to see if similar economic conditions yielded similar
election outcomes.
California and several other states with large electoral colleges (Arizona, Florida,
Texas, Illinois, New York, and New Jersey) are ling suits against the federal government
to recover costs associated with providing educational, health care, and social services
to illegal immigrants. Collectively, their actions may result in additional initiatives of
this type and have a substantial impact on national immigration policy as presidential
candidates formulate immigration policies to appease these states.
Although Proposition 187 may have had no immediate political fallout, it may have
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long-term implications for California politics. This measure has acted as a catalyst
among the Hispanic legal immigrant population of Los Angeles, causing many of these
immigrants to become citizens and acquire the right to vote. At the time of the city's
last mayoral election, one in three adult residents was not a citizen. The Los Angeles
district oce of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is currently receiving
approximately 25,000 citizenship applications a month, nearly half of which are Hispanic
in origin. This change will aect not only Los Angeles city politics but also California
state politics as this newly empowered political force gains strength. Also, in recent
years, California Republican candidates have been able to expect up to 40 percent of the
Hispanic vote, but Proposition 187 has seriously eroded this support. The Republican
Party is gaining a reputation as the anti-immigrant party. In a poll taken recently at
a citizenship class in Los Angeles County, 90 percent of the students said they would
register Democrat (Hayes-Bautista and Rodriguez, 1995). This shift in support may
change the political composition of many districts and some entire counties.
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7 Endnotes
1 This belief of labor market competition is not supported by economic labor market
research. Several examples are Bean et al. (1988), Borgas (1984), Grossman (1982), and
Killingsworth (1983).
2 Currently, this proposition is being challenged in both state and federal courts. In
November 1995, U.S. District Court Judge Mariana R. Pfaelzer ruled that most sections
of Proposition 187 are unconstitutional and that the state could not deny federally funded
health care and social services to illegal immigrants. Also, Judge Pfaelzer cited the 1982
U.S. Supreme Court case, Plyler vs. Doe, in ruling that school-aged illegal immigrants
cannot be denied access to a free public education and wrote that it was unlawful to
demand that teachers and health care providers report suspected illegal immigrants.
The judge let stand the sections of Proposition 187 which dealt with tougher penalities
concerning the making and using of counterfeit documents. The State of California
intends to appeal this decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. For a further
discussion of the legal issues, see LaVally (1994).
3 In the 1994 campaigns for both U.S. senator and governor, immigration issues were
prominent in the campaign rhetoric of the candidates as well as in the media coverage of
these races (Alvarez, 1995). As part of the Brown proposal, it was suggested that there
be a $1.00 toll for crossing the border to raise money for hiring more state and federal
border inspectors. The Wilson proposal called for additional support to be provided by
the National Guard for the INS and for direct negotiations with Mexico to end illegal
immigration. For a complete discussion of the various immigration plans proposed by
candidates in both the gubernatorial and senatorial races, see California Senate Oce of
Research (1994). In addition, the candidates used immigration images in their campaign
advertisements. For example, Wilson ran commercials in support of his candidacy and
strong stand against illegal immigration which showed Mexicans attempting to enter
California illegally by running across the border between the United States and Mexico.
In the Senate race, both candidates traded accusations of using illegal immigrants as
household laborers.
4 This emphasis on sociotropic voting over pocketbook voting is also consistent
with the economic voting literature. See, for example, Lewis-Beck (1990) and Kinder
and Kiewiet (1981).
5 Sniderman and Piazza (1993) show that there is an inverse relationship between
education and racial attitudes. Therefore, although there is a dierence between racism
and nativism, it would be reasonable to expect a similar relationship between nativism
and education.
6 For a more thorough discussion of this issue, see Cornelius (1982). He provides a
specic example of this phenomenon through data gathered during a survey of San Diego
residents.
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7 The Voter News Service (VNS) exit poll was part of the nationwide survey eort
conducted by the VNS (a consortium of national media and public opinion polling orga-
nizations) in which 3,147 registered voters leaving voting booths in California were asked
to respond to a short questionnaire. These data were obtained from the Roper Center.
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9 Appendix
The Reduced-Form Estimates
The reduced-form estimates are presented in Table 5. As discussed in Section 4, the
reduced-form equations permit us to calculate the instrumental variables for the right-
hand-side endogenous variables|the predisposition to support Proposition 187, the Re-
publican gubernatorial candidate, and the Republican senatorial candidate|which ap-
pear in our voting model. The reduced-form equations must include all of the exogenous
variables in the three equations of our model (Equation 3). Therefore, in addition to
the voter characteristic and attitudinal variables of race, gender, educational attainment,
work status, area of residence, opinion of California's economic condition, opinion of per-
sonal nancial situation, political ideology, and political party alation (for a thorough
discussion of these variables and how they were coded, see Section 4 of the paper), we
also included the relevant gubernatorial and senatorial issue variables discussed in the
specication of the senatorial and gubernatorial models (see discussion below). Next,
using these estimated coecients, we imputed the propensities for each voter to support
the initiative and the Republican senatorial and gubernatorial candidates. Finally, us-
ing these calculated values, we estimated the specied Proposition 187, senatorial, and
gubernatorial models.
Table 5 goes here
Specication of the Senatorial and Gubernatorial Models
To specify the senatorial and gubernatorial models, we include the voter characteristic
and opinion variables used in the Proposition 187 model (see Section 4): race, gender,
educational attainment, work status, area of residence, opinion of California's economic
condition, opinion of personal nancial situation, political ideology, and political party
aliation. In addition, because both senatorial and gubernatorial candidates politicized
the issue of illegal immigration, a voter's propensity to support Proposition 187 is also
included in both of these models. Finally, we also included the relevant senatorial and
gubernatorial issue variables. The survey asked each voter which one of two issues from
a list of nine mattered most in his vote for U.S. senator and California governor. For the
senatorial vote, the issues were sex of candidate, opponent's campaign spending, can-
didate's experience, Clinton's performance as president, crime, immigration, candidate
knows California, taxes, and economy/jobs. For the gubernatorial vote, the issues were
the environment, education, crime, immigration, death penalty, sex of candidate, welfare
reform, taxes, and economy/jobs. In both models, we excluded the two issues of immi-
gration and economy/jobs because of concern about endogeneity and multicollinearity,
respectively. We coded identically all of the issue variables as binary variables. If a voter
marked an issue as important in his vote choice, then the issue was coded as a 1 for
the voter; otherwise, the issue was coded 0 for the voter. The estimated results of these
models are presented in Tables 6 and 7.
Tables 6 and 7 go here
When we consider the results of the senatorial and gubernatorial models, respectively
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Tables 6 and 7, we nd that blacks and other minorities are signicantly less likely to
support the Republican candidate in both of these races than whites, which is consistent
with the tradition of minorities identifying with the Democratic party and supporting its
candidates. In the senatorial model, the voter's opinions concerning California's economy
and his personal nances are not signicant, which is consistent with the fact that the
U.S. senate is a national oce, not a state oce, so that the state's economy should be
independent of this decision. However, in the gubernatorial model, the voter's opinion
concerning the state's economy was signicant in determining candidate support (Atkeson
and Partin, 1995).
The political ideology and political party aliation of the voter coecents are signif-
icant and negatively signed in both models meaning that Democrats or liberals are more
likely to support the Democratic candidate than they are to support the Republican
candidate. This result is consistent with voting theory that voters use shortcuts, such
as party identication and ideology, in partisan races to help make a candidate choice
(Popkin, 1991). In the senatorial model, the southern California variable is signicant
and positive, which suggest that residents in this area were more likely to support the
Republican candidate than the Democratic candidate. This result is supported by this
region's traditional conservatism and by the fact that the Democratic candidate, Dianne
Feinstein, is from San Francisco in Northern California.
Next, when the issues that were important to the voter in his senatorial candidate
choice are considered (sex of candidate, spending by candidate's opponent, experience,
and candidate's knowledge of California), they correspond to the election issues and dy-
namics (the large amount of money spent during the election by both candidates, the fact
that one candidate was a woman, Dianne Feinstein was an incumbent, and Republican
candidate Michael Hungton was considered an outsider because of his recent move from
Texas to California). The issues that were signicant in gubernatorial candidate choices
are the environment, education, sex of candidate, and the death penalty. These issues
correspond to the issues discussed in the campaign. Democratic candidate Kathleen
Brown produced an education proposal and was a strong proponent of environmental
causes while Wilson, a staunch conservative, opposed additional educational spending
and supported the death penalty. Finally, an individual's vote on Proposition 187 was
not signicant in determining a voter's gubernatorial candidate choice while it was sig-
nicant in determining a voter's gubernatorial candidate choice. Specically, if a voter
favored Proposition 187, he was signicantly more likely to vote for Republican guberna-
torial candidate Pete Wilson, who campaigned for the measure. This result supports our
argument that it is necessary to consider the politcal context in which the proposition
passed. Simply, voter opinion regarding Proposition 187 inuenced candidate choices,
and candidate choice inuenced voter support for or opposition to the initiative.
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Table 1: Proposition 187 voting by voter characteristics
Survey Question Yes on 187 No on 187
% N % N
Gender
Male 57:7 512 42:3 376
Female 50:2 489 49:8 485
Race
White 59:5 823 40:5 561
Black 45:5 76 54:5 91
Hispanic/Latino 25:4 51 74:6 150
Asian 46:1 35 53:9 41
Other 57:1 16 42:9 12
Education Level
Did not complete H.S. 45:3 39 54:7 47
H.S. Graduate 63:1 169 36:9 99
Some College 60:2 351 39:8 232
College Graduate 48:6 252 51:4 266
Postgraduate Study 40:3 121 59:7 179
Employment Status
Employed 51:2 640 48:8 611
Unemployed 59:2 375 40:8 258
Area of Residence
Los Angeles City 53:4 102 46:6 89
Los Angeles Suburbs 58:1 104 41:9 75
Southern California 61:3 473 38:7 298
Bay Area 40:0 144 60:0 216
Central Valley 50:1 192 49:9 191
Note: Percentages are row percentages.
Table 2: Proposition 187 voting by voter attitudes
Survey Question Yes on 187 No on 187
% N % N
Opinion of Personal Financial Situation
Better Today 43:3 189 56:7 247
Worse Today 62:2 300 37:8 182
About the Same 52:9 468 47:1 417
Perception of California's Economic Condition
Excellent 62:5 5 37:5 3
Good 49:4 87 50:6 89
Not So Good 51:0 284 49:0 273
Poor 69:1 134 30:9 60
Political Party Aliation
Democrat 36:2 285 63:8 502
Republican 72:9 490 27:1 182
Independent 56:6 142 43:4 109
Other 43:5 37 56:5 48
Political Ideology
Liberal 31:2 127 68:8 280
Moderate 51:0 388 49:0 373
Conservative 71:4 417 28:6 167
Vote for Governor
Pete Wilson (R) 77:4 732 22:6 214
Kathleen Brown (D) 28:5 243 71:5 609
Vote for Senator
Michael Hungton (R) 79:3 602 20:7 157
Dianne Feinstein (D) 34:5 324 65:5 615
Note: Pecentages are row percentages.
Table 3: Probit and two{stage probit estimates of Proposition 187 support
Probit Two-Stage Probit
Variables Coecients Coecients
Constant 1:44 0:79
(0:29) (0:33)
Hispanic/ Latino  0:83  0:59
(0:16) (0:19)
Black  0:04 0:28
(0:17) (0:19)
Asian  0:01 0:06
(0:24) (0:25)
Other Race  0:16 0:01
(0:16) (0:16)
Personal Finance  0:03 0:00
(0:07) (0:07)
State Economy  0:26  0:25
(0:07) (0:08)
Democrat  0:76 0:03
(0:12) (0:21)
Independent  0:29 0:12
(0:13) (0:17)
Liberal  0:65  0:22
(0:14) (0:18)
Moderate  0:25  0:14
(0:11) (0:12)
Woman  0:23  0:10
(0:09) (0:10)
High School Graduate 0:07  0:17
(0:20) (0:21)
Some College  0:02  0:16
(0:18) (0:19)
College Graduate  0:27  0:30
(0:18) (0:19)
Postgraduate Study  0:40  0:35
(0:20) (:21)
Los Angeles City 0:54 0:44
(0:19) (0:19)
Los Angeles Suburbs 0:67 0:48
(0:19) (0:19)
Other 0:49 0:28
Southern California (0:13) (0:14)
Central Valley 0:17 0:10
(0:14) (0:15)
Employed  0:11  0:03
(0:10) (0:10)
Senatorial Vote 0:06
(0:10)
Gubernatorial Vote 0:31
(0:12)
Note: Maximum-likelihood estimates with estimated standard errors below in parentheses. Probit: Log
likelihood = -517.40; Number of Observations = 924; Percent correctly predicted = 71.5%.
Two-Stage Probit: Log likelihood = -507.57; Number of observations = 924; Percent correctly predicted
= 71.8%.
*Indicates an estimate that is signicant at the p = 0:10 level.
**Indicates an estimate that is signicant at the p = 0:05 level.
Table 4: The eects of voter characteristics and attitudes on Proposition 187 voting
Variables of interest Probability estimates Probability dierence
Voter race
White Black 0:57 0:68  0:11
White Hispanic/ Latino 0:57 0:34 0:23
White Asian 0:57 0:58  0:01
Opinion of California's economic condition
Excellent Poor 0:38 0:67  0:29
Good Poor 0:47 0:67  0:20
Opinion of personal nancial situation
Better Worse 0:57 0:57 0:00
Political ideology
Liberal Conservative 0:54 0:63  0:09
Party identication
Democrat Republican 0:57 0:56 0:01
Area of residence
Southern California Bay Area 0:57 0:46 0:11
Note: The hypothetical voter in this example is a white, female, Southern California
resident with an average education (some college but no degree). She thinks her family's
nancial situation is the \same" as it was two years ago and the state's economy is \not
so good." In addition, she considers herself a Democrat and, in most political matters, is
a \moderate."
Table 5: Reduced-Form Estimates
Proposition 187 Gubernatorial Senatorial
Probit Probit Probit
Variables Coecients Coecients Coecients
Constant 1:21 1:53 1:72
(0:31) (0:39) (0:38)
Hispanic/ Latino  0:84  0:82  0:16
(0:17) (0:21) (0:20)
Black  0:10  1:17  0:51
(0:17) (0:24) (0:24)
Asian  0:06  0:57 0:10
(0:25) (0:29) (0:30)
Other Race  0:12  0:37  0:38
(0:16) (0:22) (0:23)
Personal Finance  0:03  0:04  0:03
(0:07) (0:10) (0:09)
State Economy  0:23 0:02  0:09
(0:08) (0:10) (0:09)
Democrat  0:58  1:79  1:63
(0:13) (0:16) (0:16)
Independent  0:19  1:02  0:74
(0:14) (0:17) (0:16)
Liberal  0:58  0:84  0:86
(0:15) (0:19) (0:19)
Moderate  0:13  0:11  0:36
(0:12) (0:15) (0:14)
Woman  0:22  0:27  0:22
(0:10) (0:12) (0:12)
High School Graduate 0:10 0:75 0:24
(0:21) (0:27) (0:25)
Some College 0:02 0:52  0:03
(0:19) (0:24) (0:22)
College Graduate  0:19 0:32  0:19
(0:19) (0:25) (0:23)
Postgraduate Study  0:32 0:10  0:26
(0:21) (:27) (0:26)
Los Angeles City 0:50 0:17 0:41
(0:19) (0:25) (0:25)
Los Angeles Suburbs 0:57 0:27 0:50
(0:20) (0:24) (0:23)
Other 0:41 0:50 0:57
Southern California (0:13) (0:17) (0:17)
Central Valley 0:16 0:17 0:23
(0:15) (0:19) (0:19)
Employed  0:17  0:26  0:16
(0:10) (0:14) (0:13)
Senate Issue 1 0:02  0:58  0:53
Sex of Candidate (0:25) (0:37) (0:38)
Senate Issue 2  0:21  0:01  0:39
Opponent's Spending (0:17) (0:22) (0:22)
(Table 5: Reduced-Form Estimates, continued)
Proposition187 Gubernatorial Senatorial
Probit Probit Probit
Variables Coecients Coecients Coecients
Senate Issue 3  0:31  0:24  0:75
Candidate's Experience (0:11) (0:14) (0:14)
Senate lssue 4 0:12  0:35 0:05
Clinton's Performance (0:17) (0:24) (0:22)
Senate lssue 5 0:01  0:16  0:16
Crime (0:14) (0:18) (0:17)
Senate lssue 7  0:28  0:60  1:10
Candidate Knows CA (0:13) (0:16) (0:17)
Senate lssue 8 0:08 0:01 0:05
Taxes (0:17) (0:22) (0:21)
Governor Issue 1 0:11  0:43  0:03
Environment (0:18) (0:26) (0:26)
Governor Issue 2  0:21  0:65  0:10
Education (0:12) (0:15) (0:16)
Governor Issue 3 0:42 0:60 0:23
Crime (0:12) (0:15) (0:15)
Governor Issue 5 0:08 0:57 0:43
Death Penalty (0:18) (0:26) (0:23)
Governor Issue 6 0:69  0:51  1:05
Sex of Candidate (0:29) (0:48) (0:70)
Governor Issue 7 0:49 0:07  0:01
Welfare Reform (0:18) (0:22) (0:20)
Governor lssue 8 0:22 0:19 0:14
Taxes (0:16) (0:22) (0:21)
Notes: Proposition 187 Model: Maximum-likelihood estimates with estimated standard errors below in
parentheses. Log likelihood = -487.71; Number of observations = 924; Percent correctly predicted =
73.81%. Coding of dependent variable is as follows: Yes on Proposition 187 = 1; No on Proposition 187
= 0.
Governor Model: Maximum-likelihood estimates with estimated standard errors below in parentheses.
Log likelihood = -279.11; Number of observations = 900; Percent correctly predicted = 87.56%. Coding of
dependent variable is as follows: a vote for Republican candidate Pete Wilson = 1; a vote for Democratic
candidate Kathleen Brown = 0.
Senate Model: Maximum-likelihood estimates with estimated standard errors below in parcntheses. Log
likelihood=-295.62; Number of observations=861; Percent correctly predicted = 84.90%. Coding of
dependent variable is as follows: a vote for Republican candidate Michael Hungton = 1; a vote for
Democratic candidate Dianne Feinstein = 0.
*Indicates an estimate that is signicant at the p = 0:10 level.
**lndicates an estimate that is signicant at the p = 0:05 level.
Senate Issues 6 and 9 and Governor Issues 4 and 9 were excluded from the analysis (see appendix for
discussion).
Table 6: Senate voting by voter characteristics and attitudes
Constant 1:54
(0:46)
Hispanic/Latino 0:04
(0:27)
Black  0:48
(0:23)
Asian 0:19
(0:30)
other  0:41
(0:23)
Personal Financial  0:03
(0:09)
California's Economy  0:03
(0:11)
Democrat  1:44
(0:23)
Independent  0:63
(0:18)
Liberal  0:90
(0:18)
Moderate  0:39
(0:14)
Woman  0:18
(0:13)
High School Graduate 0:19
(0:24)
Some College  0:02
(0:22)
College Graduate  0:16
(0:23)
Postgraduate Study  0:18
(0:27)
Los Angeles City 0:27
(0:27)
Los Angeles Suburbs 0:33
(0:27)
Southern California 0:45
(0:19)
Central Valley 0:21
(0:19)
(Table 6: Senate voting by voter characteristics and attitudes, continued)
Senate Issue 1  0:85
Sex of Candidate (0:32)
Senate Issue 2  0:37
Opponent's Spending (0:22)
Senate Issue 3  0:69
Candidate's Experience (0:15)
Senate Issue 4 0:01
Clinton's performance (0:22)
Senate Issue 5  0:09
Crime (0:16)
Senate Issue 7  1:03
Candidate knows CA (0:18)
Senate Issue 8 0:01
Taxes (0:19)
Proposition 187 Vote 0:27
(0:21)
Note: Maximum-liklihood estimates with estimated standard errors below in parentheses.
Log likelihood = -300.04; Number of Observations 861; Percent correctly predicted =
84.55%. Coding of dependent variable is as follows: a vote for Republican candidate
Michael Hungton = 1; a vote for Democratic candidate Dianne Feinstein = 0.
*Indicates an estimate that is signicant at the p = 0:10 level. ***Indicates an estimate
that is signicant at the p = 0:05 level.
Table 7: Governor voting by voter characteristics and attitudes
Constant 0:54
(0:50)
Hispanic/Latino  0:15
(0:30)
Black  1:07
(0:24)
Asian  0:43
(0:29)
Other  0:24
(0:22)
Personal Finance  0:01
(0:09)
California's Economy 0:21
(0:12)
Democrat  1:19
(0:29)
Independent  0:75
(0:20)
Liberal  0:83
(0:18)
Moderate  0:22
(0:15)
Woman  0:08
(0:14)
High School Graduate 0:69
(0:26)
Some College 0:54
(0:24)
College Graduate 0:49
(0:26)
Postgraduate Study 0:42
(0:30)
Los Angeles City  0:29
(0:30)
Los Angeles Suburbs  0:17
(0:30)
Southern California 0:13
(0:21)
Central Valley 0:02
(0:20)
Table 7: Governor voting by voter characteristics and attitudes, continued)
Governor Issue 1  0:46
Environment (0:25)
Governor Issue 2  0:52
Education (0:17)
Governor Issue 3 0:16
Crime (0:20)
Governor Issue 5 0:39
Death Penalty (0:26)
Governor Issue 6  1:33
Sex of Candidate (0:45)
Governor Issue 7  0:34
Welfare Reform (0:26)
Governor Issue 8  0:11
Taxes (0:22)
Proposition 187 Vote 0:81
(0:30)
Note: Maximum-liklihood estimates with estimated standard errors below in parentheses.
Log likelihood = -285.06; Number of Observations 900; Percent correctly predicted =
86.89%. Coding of dependent variable is as follows: a vote for Republican candidate
Pete Wilson = 1; a vote for Democratic candidate Kathleen Brown = 0.
*Indicates an estimate that is signicant at the p = 0:10 level. ***Indicates an estimate
that is signicant at the p = 0:05 level.
